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Abstract:  
This paper looks at trade impacts of quality related standards from the supply side of the 
exporting country. We argue that food quality standards imposed by an importing country 
have profound effects on the market structure of the exporting industry, and hence a 
significant impact on the supply response. For our analysis, we develop a stylized oligopoly 
model that allows for the co-existence of complying and non-complying suppliers. The model 
is applied to two alternative policy options to explore different mechanisms an importing 
county may use to enhance the quality of its imports. We take the Polish meat sector as an 
empirical example, since after Poland’s accession to the EU the tight EU food quality 
standards indeed apply but the process of adjusting to them is far from complete – particularly 
in Polish meat production/processing. The simulations show that a subsidy scheme, such as 
the EU’s SAPARD program in Poland, can be an effective instrument to promote the 
compliance with standards and to upgrade the industry in the exporting country. 
JEL classification: Q17, Q18, L1 
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1. Introduction 
The recent discussion on food quality has been broadened beyond food safety to aspects 
such as animal welfare and environmental protection, mainly in response to consumer 
concerns in high-income countries. Due to the specific characteristics of food quality, 
information asymmetries prevail in the food market. The quality of food product is only 
revealed after consumption, and even then only imperfectly, while the producer possesses 
more reliable information. Therefore an information problem exists that may lead to an 
inadequate provision of quality. To address this market failure, governments of high-income 
countries have increasingly implemented tighter and mandatory standards in the agri-food 
sector. 
Since food quality standards differ between countries, they may restrict market access 
and can hence be considered as being non-tariff barriers to trade (NTBs). With the general 
aim of further liberalizing agricultural trade, agri-food standards and their functioning as 
NTBs has been widely discussed internationally. The main focus of debate has been on the 
issue of developing countries’ access to markets in industrialized countries that require 
compliance with certain food quality standards (World Bank, 2005). However, standards also 
influence trade flows within the European Union (EU) (Nahuis, 2004, Chevassous-Lozza et 
al., 2005, Hagemejer and Michalek, 2005.). With the recent EU enlargement the issue of 
community-wide compliance has been prominent in the policy debate, and several measures 
have been implemented to assist the accession countries in complying with the quality 
standards of the EU15. 
Market and trade effects of standards are usually analyzed by incorporating estimates of 
their tariff equivalents into trade models. For an overview of recent studies modeling 
standards and their impact on trade see Ferrantino, 2005. With the tariff equivalents reflecting 
the costs of complying with the respective standards, standards are considered to merely result 
in increased trade costs when the compliant product crosses the border. In contrast, we argue   3
that standards lead to an asymmetric distribution of firms i.e. a modern sector that complies 
with standards next to a traditional sector that does not. Consequently, common concepts of a 
continuous supply response curve are not applicable. 
The purpose of this paper is twofold. The first objective is to analyze the impact of 
foreign-imposed standards on the market structure in the exporting country and to derive 
indicators of market performance in the wake of tightening standards. The second objective is 
related to policies that aim at supporting producers in exporting countries in meeting stricter 
standards imposed by importing countries. We whish to gain insight into the efficiency of 
various policy instruments, including subsidies for quality compliance, whose application 
donor countries increasingly contemplate so as to help upcoming exporters to achieve access 
to rich-country markets. 
Focusing on the effect of import standards on the market structure in the exporting 
country, we develop an oligopoly-theoretic framework that allows for the co-existence of 
complying and non-complying suppliers. This situation is commonly found in developing 
countries, where a modern segment produces for rich-country markets. But this configuration 
is also present in the enlarged EU25, where the process of adjusting to the tight EU food 
quality standards in the new member states is generally far from complete. That is particularly 
true for Polish meat production/processing (Polish Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development, 2004). We hence choose the Polish meat sector as an empirical case study for 
the application of our model. 
2. The Model 
In the model, we distinguish between firms that comply with the standards required for 
exporting and those that do not. Complying firms supply their output to two markets i.e. the 
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Since meeting standards leads to compliance costs that only the complying firms have 
to bear, an asymmetry in cost structures is introduced. That is complying firms incur 
additional variable and fixed costs, which leads to the following cost function for complying 
firms:
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where C1 refers to the variable costs of production that are identical for the product no matter 
whether it is sold domestically or exported. C2 and F refer to the additional variable and fixed 
costs when meeting standards. 
For non-complying firms that sell on the domestic market only and hence do not incur 
additional costs, the cost function in equation (1) reduces to  ) q ( C (q) C     C(q)
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assume that marginal costs are non-decreasing with increasing levels of output (i.e. there are 
possibly diseconomies of scale in the variable cost part of the cost function), and that the 
marginal costs of serving one market depend on the supply to the other market: 
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Each complying firm maximizes profit Π
c by choosing supply to both markets: 
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d) are the inverse demand functions for the foreign and domestic 
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d denoting the relevant prices. 
                                                 
1 For convenience the subscript i for complying and j for non-complying firms is left out in the following.   5
We shall assume that demand is downward sloping (p
f ’<0 and p
d ’<0). As defined above, q
f 
and q
d refer to the complying firm’s quantity supplied on the foreign and domestic market and 
q = q
f + q
d to its total supply. 
For each complying firm the first order conditions for profit maximization are: 
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Note that by assumption marginal costs depend on each firm’s supply to both markets: 
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The first order condition for the supply to the foreign market given in equation (3) can 
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where 
f f Q / q  gives the quantity market share of one firm on the foreign market and 
f ε denotes the elasticity of foreign demand with respect to the foreign market price p
f. 
Assuming identical firms, we know that each firm i operating in the foreign market 
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c. Hence the respective firm’s market share is given by 1/n
c and can be 
plugged into equation (5). Going through the same steps for the optimal response on the 
domestic market, we arrive at an expression analogous to equation (5). 
Non-complying firms also determine their supply by maximizing profits: 
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d d d d n − = Π . Assuming Cournot behavior, we arrive at an expression 
                                                 
2 Alternative behavioral assumptions could of course be introduced here. For example conjectural elasticities that 
are different from unity.   6
linking marginal costs of production for the domestic market to demand elasticity and market 
share
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Since on the domestic market (identical) non-complying firms compete with (identical) 
complying firms, the market share expression is a bit more involved even in the symmetric 































c q  and 
d
n q  denote the equilibrium supply to the domestic market of one complying and 
one non-complying firm, respectively. 
In summary, the following expressions give each firm’s first order conditions to the 
profit-maximizing problem: 
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To ensure market equilibrium, domestic supply equals domestic demand and supply to 
the foreign market equals export demand: 
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3 Alternatively, we might want to specify non-complying firms as a price-taking competitive fringe. In this case 
their supply will be determined by the equality between price and marginal cost (the term between brackets in 
equation (7) becomes 1.0). However, since the number of non-complying firms in a typical developing country 
as well as in our illustrative application for Poland will be very large, equality between marginal cost and price is 
very likely to be achieved anyway.    7
The above expressions can already be used to derive some useful (standard) insights. 
First, increasing the number of firms lets prices converge towards marginal cost, see 
equations 6 and 7. Secondly, the lower the price elasticity (given n) the higher the price-cost 
margin (Lerner index). Since export demand for food products is typically more price elastic 
than domestic demand, one might expect domestic price-cost margins to be higher than those 
obtained on the export market. However, this depends on the number of firm as well. If the 
domestic market is populated by a large number of small firms, a competitive fringe, mark-
ups on the domestic market will be driven towards zero. 
3. Empirical Application of the Model 
3.1. Background 
With the EU eastward enlargement of the 1
st of May 2004, Poland has taken over the 
entire body of EU rules and regulations in all sectors of the economy (acquis communitaire). 
Although the alignment of regulations has begun during the preparation period towards EU 
membership, the implementation and enforcement of the tight EU agri-food standards does 
not yet meet the requirements at all levels. This is particularly true for meat production/ 
processing where substantial deficiencies in meeting the EU hygiene and veterinary standards 
exist (Polish Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, 2004). 
The EU hygiene and veterinary standards predominantly comprise production/process 
standards. As opposed to product standards, production standards specify the method of 
producing food products. Production standards can be further differentiated by product related 
and non-product related production standards. In the meat sector, the former refer to certain 
requirements concerning handling and storage, which have a direct impact on the quality and 
safety of meat products (e.g. temperature control, cleaning of equipment, packaging and 
veterinary checks). The latter do not influence product characteristics per se. That is they 
constitute requirements for facility conditions (e.g. separation of “clean” and “dirty” rooms, 
washing and disinfection facilities), administrative requirements (e.g. record keeping, carcass   8
classification/labeling) as well as the implementation of the hygiene control system HACCP 
(Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points)
4. For a detailed overview of the entire array of 
EU standards in meat production/processing see Becker, 2000. 
In addition to the EU standards obligatory when producing for the domestic market, 
enterprises have to fulfill further regulations so as to supply the EU market. These particularly 
comprise additional requirements concerning product testing, storage and transportation. The 
standards for slaughterhouses/cutting plants and meat processing firms to be eligible for 
exporting to other member states are set in the following directives: 
- Directive 64/433/EEC on health conditions for the production and marketing of fresh meat
5: 
- Directive 77/99/EEC on health problems in the production and marketing of meat products 
However, exemptions exist for small-scale firms that do not prescribe them to fully 
comply with EU standards. Due to problems in the practical application of the EU hygiene 
and veterinary standards, they are granted special provisions that allow them to continue 
producing for the domestic market even without meeting the EU requirements.
6 This 
particularly concerns administrative matters such as documentation and record keeping, 
which can constitute a considerable burden for small-scale firms. The possibility of 
exempting low capacity firms from fully complying with the EU standards is of major 
importance for the Polish meat sector, which is dominated by small firms (Pieniadz et al., 
2003).
7  
                                                 
4 According to Directive 93/43/EEC (OJ L175, 19.7.1993), the HACCP system, which provides a systematic 
approach to identify, monitor and control issues of hygiene and food safety, is mandatory in the EU meat 
processing sector. 
5 Note that Directive 94/65/EC (OJ L368, 31.12.1994) on placing minced meat and meat preparations on the EU 
market is not considered in the following, Its required standards are very specific and exceed those of Directive 
64/433/EEC (OJ P121, 29.7.1964) and 77/99/EEC (OJ L26, 31.1.1977). 
6 For the fresh meat sector, Directive 95/23/EC (OJ L243, 11.10.1995) defines the production capacity of small-
scale enterprises eligible for special provisions as follows: slaughter houses: ≤ 20 livestock units/week and ≤ 
1000 livestock units/week; cutting plants: ≤ 5t/week. Meat processing enterprises with a production output ≤ 
7.5t/week are considered to be of low capacity (Commission Decision 94/383/EC, OJ L174, 8.7.1994). 
7 Note that according to Directive 2004/41/EC (OJ L195, 02.06.2004) a new “package of hygiene requirements” 
will be applicable for the EU meat sector from 2006 onwards. This may not necessarily allow for special 
treatment of low capacity enterprises anymore. The negotiations are still under way.   9
Figure 1 illustrates the current situation of compliance with the EU hygiene and 
veterinary standards of Directive 64/433/EEC and 77/99/EEC. Only 19% of the Polish meat 
firms fully comply with the EU standards and are thus licensed to export to the EU market. 
Being high capacity enterprises, their output makes up for 65% of the total meat production in 
Poland. In prospect of their compliance in the near future, 10% of the Polish meat firms have 
been granted a transitional period. They are allowed to continue producing without meeting 
the EU standards until December 2007 (European Commission, 2003), but their non-
compliant products are only permitted on the Polish market or to be exported to third 
countries - not to other EU member states. 












*This refers to slaughterhouses and processing enterprises of pork, beef/veal and poultry meat complying with 
Directive 64/433/EEC and 77/99/EEC. 
Source: own illustration based on Pieniadz and Hanf (2005) and calculation using data source: IERiGZ (2005). 
About 70% of the Polish meat firms do not meet the EU standards. With their low 
production capacity, they fall under the EU’s special provision for small-scale enterprises. 
Complying with the simplified EU standards, 47% of the Polish meat firms are authorized to 
sell on the Polish national market only. The remaining 24% show the largest shortcomings in 
meeting the EU standards. In order to account for their difficult situation, a special law that 
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enacted just before accession (Pieniadz and Hanf, 2005). According to this law, their non-
compliant products are to be sold on the very local market only – i.e. directly to end-
consumers. 
Complying with standards leads to compliance costs. Depending on the requirements of 
standards, compliance costs can add to the fixed or variable costs of production. Additional 
fixed costs occur when firms have to undertake investments so as to meet standards. In the 
Polish meat sector, especially the large number of low capacity firms has to substantially 
invest in modernizing production facilities and acquiring new equipment so as to meet the EU 
standards (Polish Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, 2004). Apart from on-site 
investments, Polish meat firms have to provide training for personnel that have to learn how 
to handle the new production methods and procedures required. In order to support Polish 
meat firms in undertaking these serious investments, EU funds have been made available, in 
particular within the SAPARD scheme
8. 
Depending on the firms’ initial technology and production efficiency, compliance with 
standards affects variable costs. In the case of the Polish meat sector, it can be argued that 
standards advancing production technology by upgrading this rather traditional sector 
improve the production efficiency and lower average variable costs of production. However, 
meeting the EU hygiene and veterinary standards, which may result in pro-competitive 
effects, is likely to increase variable costs, too. Complying firms are to employ additional and 
possibly more costly inputs and may face a substantial increase in labor costs due to the 
frequent controls and detailed documentation required. Despite possible advantages of control 
systems and record keeping, Antle (1998) for example shows that the implementation of the 
                                                 
8 The EU's SAPARD program (Special Accession Program for Agriculture and Rural Development) assists the 
agri-food sector in the new member states in adjusting to the EU policies. It particularly focuses on improving 
the production/processing of agri-food products. Within the SAPARD program, Poland is allocated an indicative 
budget of 150 636 million Euro/year (at constant 1999 prices) for 2000-2006 (Regulation (EC) 1268/1999, OJ 
L161, 26.06.1999).   11
HACCP system leads to higher variable costs even in the efficient US beef industry. On this 
basis, the variable costs of complying Polish meat firms can be expected to be considerable 
higher than those of non-complying ones. 
To summarize: The state of compliance with the EU hygiene and veterinary standards 
determines the market possibilities of Polish meat firms. Whereas firms not meeting the EU 
requirements are only allowed to offer their products at the Polish national or very local 
market, complying firms in fact serve two different markets. On the one hand, they can sell 
their products on the Polish national market. On the other hand, they can also export their 
products to the other EU member countries. Since meeting the EU standards raises production 
costs (fixed and variable), complying firms face additional costs non-complying firms do not 
incur. 
3.2. Model Specification, Data and Calibration 
For the application of our model to the Polish meat sector, we need to specify functional 
forms for the cost and demand functions. Regarding the cost functions, we incorporate two 
important notions: First, the distinction between production costs and costs of compliance 
(both variable and fixed). Secondly, the interdependence in marginal costs between the supply 
to the domestic and foreign market. A functional form that fulfils these requirements is the 
quadratic one:  F q * b ) q (q   * a     C(q) f 2 f d + + + =  where q
f and F are zero for non-complying 
firms. 
As regards the demand functions, we use a constant elasticity specification for both 
markets:  ( )
d
d d d d Q * B ) Q ( p p
ε
= = and  ( )
f
f f f f Q * A ) Q ( p p
ε
= = . That is p
d(Q
d) refers to the 
Polish domestic demand for Polish meat. Similarly, focusing on Polish meat exports to the 
EU15 market, p
f(Q
f) represents the export demand function determining the EU15’s demand 
for Polish meat. These demand functions are of course extremely simple, and ignore the 
intricacies of consumer demand in a market for differentiated products. Consumers might be   12
able to distinguish between the supplies of complying and non-complying firms. In this case, 
substitutability between the two types of products has to be introduced. 
In order to calibrate the cost and demand functions specified above, we use data from 
various sources; see table A.1 in the appendix for a summary account and overview of the 
Polish meat sector in 2004. Concerning data of compliance costs, we use information on 
investments that are undertaken by Polish meat firms so as to adjust their production to the 
EU standards as a proxy for the fixed cost component of the compliance costs. The variable 
costs of compliance are considered to be reflected by the difference between the Polish and 
EU15 price for meat. Figure A.1 in the appendix illustrates the difference between the meat 
price in Poland and the EU. 
Calibrating the cost functions, we derive point estimates for the parameters a and b. For 
non-complying firms we set average costs equal to price in order to obtain an estimate of the 
parameter a. For complying firms we solve simultaneously for the following two conditions 
to retrieve the parameters a and b: 
1)  average variable costs = average unit revenue on the domestic and foreign market 
2)  marginal costs to the foreign market = marginal revenue on the foreign market (eq.6) 
The estimate of the demand elasticity for the domestic Polish meat demand comes from 
the database of the ESIM model, the one for the demand for Polish meat export to the EU15 
from the GTAP v.6 database.
9 Table A.2 in the appendix reports on the parameters used for 
the simulations. Note that the cost parameter estimates imply that complying firms are more 
efficient in their production. 
3.3. Simulation Scenarios 
We conduct two sets of simulations.
10 The first simulation is designed to show the 
implications of stricter standards on the export market. This is implemented by a shift of the 
                                                 
9 We are grateful to the ESIM team of the University of Göttingen to provide the elasticity estimates.  
10 The model is solved with GEMPACK 9.    13
export demand function: the EU15 market demands less of the Polish product. This can also 
be seen as a proxy of NTBs related to product quality. At any given price, demand is lower 
than it would be in the absence of the quality-related trade barrier. We simulate a range of 
demand shifts implemented by changes (-5% to -50%) in the constant term of the export 
demand function. The second set of simulations pertains to subsidies that lower the fixed 
costs of compliance as the EU’s financial support under the SAPARD scheme does. 
For both simulation scenarios, it is useful to specify a long-run equilibrium benchmark. 
We specify this benchmark using a zero-profit condition with free entry and exit on the 
market and let the number of complying firms n
c adjust.
11 Note that with this additional 
constraint, the model is quite similar to a long-run monopolistic competition model. 
Simulating this benchmark of zero profit and free entry and exit by complying firms, the 
structure of the industry changes: Table A.3 and A.4 (see appendix) show that the number of 
complying firms more than doubles, but each firm is about 40% smaller in terms of output 
than in the base, and total industry supply rises by only 3%. Free entry drives size down. 
Furthermore domestic and export prices fall significantly, but the export market remains the 
most profitable alternative for complying firms. They are able to boost their collective export 
revenues from 97 to 260 million euro. Against this long-run equilibrium benchmark, the 
aforementioned scenarios are simulated. 
4. Simulation Results 
4.1. Results of Simulation 1 - Export Demand Shock 
The decline of export demand following stricter export standards leads to a decrease of 
export prices, but also to a decrease of domestic prices as “modern” complying firms shift 
their supply to the domestic market (see table A.3 in the appendix). Each “modern” firm 
supplies less to the export market and more to the domestic market. While “modern” firms 
                                                 
11 The calibration of the model to the base data has positive profits for complying firms. Non-complying firms 
have zero profits, as their average costs equal price in the base.    14
can partly accommodate the lower demand on their most profitable outlet i.e. the export 
market, “traditional” non-complying firms are unable to do so and consequently contract their 
output. As a result the combined market share of complying firms on the domestic market 
increases from 73.9% to 75%, depending on the size of the demand shift. 
Lower domestic prices fuel domestic demand to some extent, but as the price elasticity 
for meat is small (-0.43) the additional demand is limited and the domestic price decreases. 
Industry revenues fall as well, up to -22% in the simulation with the largest inward shift of 
demand (simulation number 5). While profits in the meat industry remain zero, Polish 
consumers gain from the lower price and the increased supply. On balance, the net welfare 
change is therefore estimated to be positive, between 4 and 16 million euro. However, this is 
an incomplete measure of welfare changes: Since the supply of complying firms to the Polish 
market is simulated to rise, more high quality produce will be available. This should ideally 
be accounted for in the welfare evaluation, which would then require the specification of a 
more elaborate demand system derived from a utility function that includes quality aspects. 
4.2. Results of Simulation 2 - Investment Subsidy for Compliance 
The simulation set of an investment subsidy for firms so as to comply with standards 
reveals drastic changes in industry structure. As opposed to the set of the export demand 
shocks above, the number of complying firms more than doubles. With the investment 
subsidy modeled as a reduction of fixed costs, average costs for complying firms are lowered 
and the minimum efficient scale drops. The relationship between the equilibrium number of 
complying firms and the minimum efficient scale (mes) is illustrated in figure 2.  
   15
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Note: MES is calculated as output per firm in the zero-profit equilibrium. 
Source: model simulations.  
Due to the massive entry of subsidized complying firms, the non-complying firms are 
almost completely driven off the market. Their market share falls from initially about 30% to 
merely 5% when the fixed costs of compliance are halved by the subsidy. Total domestic and 
export supply increase and prices fall, but nevertheless the total sales revenues of the industry 
increase. 
Again, the big winners are Polish consumers, as their consumer surplus increases with 
lower prices and higher average quality supplied to the market. A second group of winners are 
EU15 consumers, since they experience increased supplies of compliant Polish meat at lower 
prices. Of course, the cost of the subsidy needs to be balanced against the gain in consumer 
surplus and the utility gain from the supply of products of improved quality. Table A.4 (see 
appendix) shows that the size of the subsidy exceeds the change in consumer surplus if the 
subsidy increases beyond 15% of the fixed costs of compliance. But of course, this is an 
illustrative simulation and the numbers should be interpreted with great care. 
5.  Concluding remarks 
This paper looks at the issue of trade impacts of quality related standards from the 
supply side of the exporting country. More specifically, we show that standards imposed by 
an importing country have profound effects on the market structure of the exporting industry,   16
and hence a significant impact on the supply response. For the analysis we develop a stylized 
model that allows for the co-existence of complying and non-complying suppliers - a situation 
commonly found in developing countries, where a modern segment produces for rich-country 
markets. But this configuration is also present in the enlarged EU25, in particular in Polish 
meat production/processing as our review of its state of compliance shows. 
The model is applied to two alternative policy options. The two sets of simulations 
reflect two different mechanisms an importing country may use to enhance the quality of its 
imports. The first one is simply a border measure that comes at no budgetary cost to the 
importer and the second entails a subsidy that may be borne by the importer, as in the case of 
the SAPARD program in Poland. The simulations show that a subsidy scheme that lowers the 
fixed cost of compliance can be a very effective instrument to promote the compliance with 
standards and to upgrade the industry in the exporting country. The border measure, in 
contrast, mainly leads to shifts of supply towards domestic markets and to increased 
competition with complying and non-complying firms co-existing, which eventually benefits 
domestic consumers only. Our model thus provides a structured way to assist donor countries 
in determining the level and type of assistance they might want to provide to upcoming 
exporters. 
There are obviously a number of extensions of the analytical framework presented. On 
the theoretical side the most relevant one may be to endogenize the investment decision of 
non-complying firms to become “modern”. Another improvement concerns the modeling of 
consumer preferences for differentiated products, and in relation to that the derivation of a 
more complete welfare measure that accounts for quality changes. On the empirical side, 
improvements in the estimation of compliance cost rank high on the research agenda. 
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Appendix 








(Traditional) Total  Note/source 
Number of firms    397  1693  2090  Pieniadz and Hanf 
(2005), IERiGZ (2005) 
Output  1000 t  231  124  355  ZMP (2005), calculation 
based on IERiGZ (2005) 
Output per firm  1000 t  0.58  0.07  0.17  calculated 
Volume domestic 
demand 
1000 t  184  124  309  ZMP (2005) (calculated 
per cap*pop), for modern 











96954 0  96954  COMEXT  (2005) 
Volume Export 
demand, EU15 
1000 t  46  0  46  COMEXT(2005) 
TOTAL REVENUE  EUR 
1000 
344234 166702  510937  calculated 
Price domestic 
market 
EUR/t    1342  EU  commission, 
calculated from EU15/PL 
price ratio 




Table A.2: Cost and elasticity estimates 
    Cost structure per firm 




Cost function parameters:       
Variable production cost per 
unit: a 
 0.001  0.009 
Variable compliance cost per 
unit: b 
 0.897  - 
Variable production cost  EUR 1000  338  98 
Variable compliance cost  EUR 1000  105  0 
Annual fixed cost (linear 
depreciation, 15 years 
lifetime) 
EUR 1000  59  0 
TOTAL COST   EUR 1000  502  98 
 
   Demand  elasticities 
Price elasticity domestic 
market  
(1) -0.429 
Price elasticity export demand 
PL-EU15 
(2) -7.6 
Notes: source (1) ESIM database, (2) Calculated from GTAP v.6.   19
Table A.3: Simulation 1 - Export Demand Shock 
Note: (*) percent level in simulation, not percent change. 
Source: model simulations. 
 
 
Simulations   







Percent change relative to zero 
profit benchmark 
Export demand shifter 
 
31433 EUR  1000 31433  -5  -10  -15  -20  -50 
Number of firms                 
Complying  firms  397 unit 903  0.4  -2.9  -6.1  -9.4  -29.2 
Non-complying firms 
 
1693  unit  1963  0 0 0 0 0 
Price on domestic market  1342  EUR/ton  814.2  -1.0  -1.2  -1.4  -1.6  -3.6 
Export price 
 
2088  EUR/ton  1557.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 -1.6 
Supply to export market/firm                 
Complying firms  117  tons  196.3  -1.9 -3.3 -4.8 -6.5  -19.8 
Non-complying  firms  0  tons  0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total supply export market  46431  tons  174933 -1.6  -6.1  -10.6  -15.3  -43.2 
               
Supply to domestic market/firm                 
Complying firms  464  tons  126.2  0.3 3.8 7.5  11.5  44.4 
Non-complying firms  73  tons  44.6  -1.0 -1.2 -1.4 -1.6 -3.6 
Total supply domestic market  308474  tons  189458 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 1.6 
Quantity share of modern firms 
on domestic market (*) 
60 %  73.9  74  74.1  74.1  74.2  75.0 
               
Total  supply/firm               
Complying  firms  581  tons  319.8 -1.4 -1.7 -2.0 -2.3 -5.0 
Non-complying firms  73  tons  44.6  -1.0 -1.2 -1.4 -1.6 -3.6 
Total industry supply  354905  tons  354390 -1.0  -4.4  -7.7  -11.1  -31.7 
               
Industry sales revenues     EUR  million 
Total export value  97  EUR Mill.  260  267 254 242 229 150 
Domestic  sales  414 EUR  Mill. 321 319 319 318 318 315 
Total  511 EUR  Mill. 581 586 573 560 547 465 
               
Welfare indicators     EUR  million 
Change consumer surplus        4 5 6 7  16 
Change industry profits        0 0 0 0 0 
Total welfare change 
 
    4  5  6  7  16   20
 
Table A.4: Simulation 2 - Investment subsidy for compliance 
Simulations   











0  -5  -10 -15 -20 -50 
Number  of  firms             
Complying  firms 397  unit  903  94  98  102 106 129 
Non-complying  firms  1693 unit 1693  0 0 0 0 0 
             
Price on domestic market  1342  EUR/ton  814.2  -22.2 -23.1 -24.0 -24.9 -30.4 
Export price 
 
2088 EUR/ton  1557.4  -11.7  -12.2 -12.7 -13.2 -16.0 
Supply to export market/firm                 
Complying  firms 117  tons  193.6 -5.0 -5.2 -5.4 -5.6 -6.8 
Non-complying firms  0  tons  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total supply to export market  46431  tons  174933 89.0 92.7 96.3 99.9 122 
             
Supply to domestic 
market/firm 
           
Complying firms  464  tons  126.2  -63.6 -66.1 -68.7 -71.3 -86.9 
Non-complying firms  73  tons  44.6  -22.2 -23.1 -24.0 -24.9 -30.3 
Total supply to domestic 
market 
308474  tons  189458 9.5  9.9  10.3 10.7 13.0 
Quantity share of modern 
firms on domestic market(*) 
60  %  73.9  89.4 90.0 90.7 91.3 95.1 
             
Total supply per firm                 
Complying firms  581  tons  319.8  -28.1 -29.3 -30.4 -31.5 -38.4 
Non-complying firms  73  tons  44.6  -22.2 -23.1 -24.0 -24.9 -30.3 
Total  industry  supply  354905  tons  364390 43.8 45.6 47.4 49.1 59.8 
             
Industry sales revenues      EUR million 
Total  export  value  97  EUR  Mill 260  460 468 477 485 534 
Domestic  sales  414 EUR  Mill 321  280 279 277 275 265 
Total  511 EUR  Mill 581  741 747 754 760 799 
             
Welfare indicators      EUR million 
Change  consumer  surplus        107 111 116 120 149 
Change  industry  profits        0 0 0 0 0 
Subsidy        -27  -103 -158 -215 -548 
Total welfare change 
 
    80  8  -42  -95  -399 
Note: (*) percent level in simulation, not percent change. 
Source: model simulations.   21
 






























EU beef  PL beef EU pork PL pork EU poultry PL poultry